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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
In his Opening Brief, Hamish Bell set forth how his right to procedural due process was 
violated throughout the administrative hearing proceedings and established the Hearing Officer 
erred by sustaining his driver's license suspension. In response, the Department first confuses 
the applicable standard of review in this matter. The Department suggests this Court review the 
district court's decision affirming the Idaho Transportation Department's ("lTD") decision 
upholding the administrative suspension ofMr. Bell's driving privileges for an abuse of 
discretion. Respondent's Brief, p.11. Although certain discretionary decisions by the Hearing 
Officer are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, as pointed out in Mr. Bell's Opening Brief, this 
Court is tasked with "review[ing] the agency record independently of the district court's 
decision." In re Druffel, 136 Idaho 853, 855,41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002) (citations omitted). 
Specifically: 
This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the 
record. 
[This] court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) 
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) 
are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The party challenging the agency decision 
must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.e. § 67-5279(3) 
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. If the agency's 
decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary." 
In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941-42, 155 P .3d 1176, 1180-81 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
1. The Hearing Officer's Subpoenas Denied Mr. Bell Due Process 
As explained in his Opening Brief, the subpoenas issued by the Hearing Officer violated 
Mr. Bell's procedural due process rights. The subpoenas issued in this matter were 
constitutionally unsound because they prevented Mr. Bell from presenting a defense and carrying 
his statutory burden. See I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Subpoenas with a compliance date of June 29, 
2009, for a hearing scheduled for June 30, 2009, especially when the subpoenaed materials are 
not produced directly to the petitioner, thus resulting in a further delay in production, deprived 
Mr. Bell from a fair proceeding. 
The Department argues that since neither the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act or the 
Idaho Code prescribe a time frame for when a petitioner should be provided relevant material 
there was not a due process violation in this case. Simply because the adopted procedures and 
statutes do not have a time frame does not cure the constitutional defect. Put differently, the 
mere absence of a statutory requirement does not exempt the Department from the due process 
guarantees of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
Both parties acknowledge that to determine whether a due process violation exists, three 
factors must be considered: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 946,155 P.3d at 1185 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903,47 L.Ed.2d 18,33(1976)). 
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First, there is little dispute, and the Department agrees, that Mr. Bell has a substantial 
interest in maintaining his driver's license. With regard to the second factor, under the current 
procedures, providing a petitioner with the requested materials with very little or no time to 
adequately review them actually increases the risk that there could be an erroneous deprivation of 
a petitioner's driving privileges. And third, though there is a compelling interest in keeping 
Idaho roads free from intoxicated drivers, substitute procedural requirements would have little if 
any fiscal or administrative burdens on the LTD. The LTD could easily issue subpoenas that 
require the requested materials to be provided directly to a petitioner and/or with a compliance 
deadline sufficient enough to provide for a meaningful review of the materials. 
The Court of Appeals provided some insight on this issue in In re Gibbar when it found 
the discovery process in that case constitutionally sufficient because it had "enabled Gibbar to 
receive, a few days in advance of the hearing, the logsheet for the breath testing instrument used 
in this case as well as all materials forwarded to the ITD by the Clearwater County Sheriff s 
Office .... " 143 Idaho at 948, 155 P.3d at 1187 (emphasis added). 
Unlike Mr. Gibbar, the time frame for discovery in this case was not "long enough to 
provide him with discovery responses in sufficient time that he could utilize them for the 
hearing." Id. Accordingly, subpoenas which permit disclosure of documentary evidence only 
hours before the hearing, and actually pennit disclosure of audio recordings after the hearing has 
occurred, are the definition of unconstitutional. 
2. The Hearing Officer Impermissibly Extended the Hearing Process 
Originally scheduled for June 30, 2009, the Hearing Officer extended Mr. Bell's hearing 
until July 9, 2009. As permitted by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), this one-time continuance was 
permitted if good cause was established. What is not authorized by the statute, is a second 
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continuance. Thus the decision by the Hearing Officer to continue the hearing a second time, this 
time until July 23, 2009, all while Mr. Bell was denied a meaningful hearing even though his 
driving privileges had already been suspended, was an abuse of the Hearing Officer's discretion. 
The Department asserts Mr. "Bell can point to no authority providing that vacating a 
suspension is required if the administrative suspension hearing is extended for more than ten (10) 
days." Respondent's Brief, p.14. The Department also asserts the "hearing officer acted in 
accordance with Idaho Code in deciding to reschedule the hearing." !d. In fact, the Hearing 
Officer acted inapposite of Idaho Code and improperly extended the hearing beyond what is 
authorized by Section 18-8002A(7) of the Idaho Code. Moreover, the authority for vacating the 
suspension is premised in the procedural due process guarantees of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions which preclude the suspension of an issued license without first conducting a 
meaningful and fair hearing. The statute permits the Hearing Officer one 10-day extension. 
Nothing more. 
The Department continues though, arguing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors justify the 
suspension of Mr. Bell's license. Respondent's Brief, p.16-17. The Department again concedes 
Mr. "Bell's interest in his driver's license is substantial." Id. at16. Then, the Department argues 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation is minimal because "[t]he risk of erroneous observation or 
deliberate misrepresentation by the reporting officer of the facts forming the basis for the 
suspension is insubstantial." Respondent's Brief, p.16 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 
2,99 S.Ct. 2612, 2613 (1979». First, the Department fails to address the entirety of the second 
Mathews factor - the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, ({any, oj additional or substitute procedural saJeguards. Nowhere in 
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Respondent's Brief is the latter portion even discussed. Moreover, the "risk of erroneous 
observation or deliberate misrepresentation by the reporting officer" is actually very real in this 
case. As Mr. Bell pointed out in his Opening Brief, Officer White, the reporting officer in this 
case and whose affidavit was relied upon to uphold Mr. Bell's suspension, was terminated from 
the Boise Police Department because of credibility issues. The Department omits this crucial 
fact from its analysis. 
3. The Hearing Officer Wrongfully Refused Mr. Bell's Request for Subpoenas 
Regarding Officer White's Certification 
Mr. Bell had a right to substantiate whether the officer conducting the breath test was 
currently certified to use the breath testing machine. See In re Masterson, 150 Idaho 126,244 
P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010). This was confirmed by the district court - "the hearing officer erred 
in concluding Officer White's certification was irrelevant." R.164. Still, the Department argues 
the Hearing Officer's denial ofMr. Bell's request for a copy of Officer White's certification was 
not an abuse of discretion because Officer White's sworn statement indicated that he was 
properly certified and was therefore sufficient evidence on this issue. 
This argument however makes little sense. If a petitioner were unable to obtain materials 
relating to information contained within an officer's sworn statement then the administrative 
hearing process would be truly illUSOry. Apparently, according to the Department, a petitioner 
should never be able to obtain materials or challenge the suspension of their driving privileges so 
long as a law enforcement's boiler-plate sworn affidavit adequately addresses the provisions 
contained in Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7). If the Department's argument prevails, then upon 
receipt of the officer's sworn statement there would be no reason to have a hearing at all. 
Here, Mr. Bell was denied the opportunity to challenge relevant evidence at his hearing. 
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The certification card sought by Mr. Bell is mandated by IDAPA and/or the SOP's to be kept by 
the officer and/or the agency maintaining the breath testing device. See IDAPA § 
1l.03.0l.013.04 (requiring operator certification); and SOP § l.6 ("It is the responsibility of each 
individual agency to store calibration records, subject records, maintenance records, instrument 
logs, or any other records as pertaining to the evidentiary use of breath testing instruments and to 
maintain a current record of operator certification."). Failing to issue the requested subpoena 
impaired Mr. Bell's right to present a defense and is contrary to the protections afforded by the 
Due Process Clause of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
4. The Hearing Officer Wrongfully Refused Mr. Bell's Requests for Subpoenas 
Regarding Calibration Checks 
In response to Mr. Bell's argument that he was entitled to the requested log sheets and 
calibration checks, the Department first concedes Mr. Bell was permitted to challenge the breath 
test results but then suggests producing the requested documents approximately one hour before 
a rescheduled hearing is good enough. Respondent's Brief, p.19. More specifically, the 
Department argues since Mr. Bell received the log sheets for April 28, 2009 through June 6, 2009 
sixty-three (63) minutes before the rescheduled hearing his argument is "moot." Id. 
The Department's argument fails to recognize the circumstances leading up to the last 
minute disclosure of these log sheets. Mr. Bell's first subpoena request was effectively denied 
when it was limited in scope to merely four days of log sheets. Then, no subpoena was ever 
issued in response to Mr. Bell's second request for a subpoena. Ex.l, pp.27-28. Instead, 
approximately half of what was sought by Mr. Bell was randomly produced approximately one 
hour before the rescheduled hearing. Undeniably Mr. Bell was given insufficient time to utilize 
these materials at the July 9th hearing. As a result, and as discussed above, the Hearing Officer 
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impermissibly continued the hearing a second time. Still, the Hearing Officer never issued a 
subpoena for log sheets spanning more than 4 days. 
In sum, the Hearing Officer's refusal to issue a subpoena for anything other than log 
sheets spanning June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009 was not only an abuse of discretion but also 
deprived Mr. Bell of his right to procedural due process under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
5. The Hearing Officer Erred in Finding the Boise Police Department Complied with 
the lTD Subpoena 
In his Opening Brief Mr. Bell set forth how at least two of the Hearing Officer's findings 
of fact are not supported by any evidence in the record. The Department argues in response that 
Mr. "Bell obviously believes that the hearing officer is not being truthful. There is no reason to 
believe, and no evidence proving, that the hearing officer is lying." Respondent's Brief, p.2l. 
Interestingly, the Department does not point to anywhere in the record supporting the contested 
findings of fact. Nonetheless, the Department is correct in that there is no evidence the Hearing 
Officer lied. Mr. Bell has no idea whether the Hearing Officer is a truthful person. What Mr. 
Bell is certain of, however, is whatever the reason, there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
supporting the following findings of fact: 
1. The Boise Police Department timely complied with the Subpoena Duces Tecum; 
and 
2. The subpoenaed material got misplaced at the Idaho Transportation Department. 
Ex.I, p.297 ~ 8 (emphasis added). 
The only subpoena ever issued by the Hearing Officer for log sheets required the 
production oflog sheets for June 6, 2009 through June 9, 2009 with a compliance date of June 
29,2009. Ex. 1, p.18. As of June 25, 2009 the Records Custodian of the Boise Police 
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Department confirmed even this subpoena had not yet been complied with. Ex. 1, p.69. The 
only log sheets Mr. Bell was provided with in this matter were provided to him the morning of 
the July 9th hearing, well after the June 29th compliance date. There is no evidence in the record 
as to when these log sheets were received by lTD or who provided the them to ITD. Nor was 
there a cover letter with them as the Records Custodian of the Boise Police Department had 
previously provided with the other subpoenaed materials. Moreover, the produced log sheets are 
not responsive to the subpoena in that they are well beyond the scope of the subpoena. Simply 
put, the record is devoid of any evidence supporting a factual finding that the Boise Police 
Department timely complied with the subpoena at issue or that the log sheets were misplaced by 
lTD. There is no evidence that the Boise Police Department provided log sheets for June 6, 2009 
through June 9, 2009 on or before June 29, 2009. Similarly, there is no evidence that these log 
sheets were timely received yet misplaced by ITD. 
6. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded the Breath Testing Instrument Had 
Been Maintained in Accordance with IDAP A and the Standard Operating 
Procedures 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Bell spent considerable time setting forth how the evidence 
presented to the Hearing Officer affirmatively showed the State failed to comply with both 
IDAPA and the SOP's. In response the Department first argues that the Calibration Checklist 
showing that a 0.08 calibration check was not performed on June 25, 2009 and that the State 
inappropriately waiting twice as long to conduct the statutory required calibration checks are 
"irrelevant." Respondent's Brief, p.24. The Department argues Mr. Bell does not "know[] for 
certain" what the Calibration Checklist means and that it "is not conclusive evidence that the 
State waited twice as long to conduct the required checks." !d. Fortunately for Mr. Bell, he is 
not required to prove "for certain" that either IDAPA or the SOP's were not complied with. 
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Rather, as he established before the Hearing Officer, Mr. Bell must only prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the procedures for the maintenance and operation of breath 
testing equipment was not complied with. See I.e. § 18-8002A(7); and In re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 
656,659-60,99 P.3d 125, 128-29 (CL App. 2004). 
The remainder of the Department's argument is that notwithstanding the various 
procedural failures by the State, since a calibration check was performed on June 3, 2009, two (2) 
days prior to Mr. Bell's arrest, compliance with IDAPA and the SOP's was acheived. 
Respondent's Brief, pp.24-26. In order for this Court to conclude as the Department suggests, it 
would need to find that there exists an implied provision in both the IDAPA and the SOP's - that 
so long as the calibration check closest to, or just prior to, a petitioner's breath test is okay then 
the State is in compliance with its own procedures. There is no such provision however. Instead, 
the IDAP A, SOP's, and the Department's admission that "0.08 calibration checks are required 
every 100 samples" makes subsequent calibration checks relevant. 
7. The State's Adopted Procedures for the Breath Testing Device Do Not Ensure 
Accuracy and Proper Functioning 
As explained in Mr. Bell's Opening Brief, through the numerous revisions, the Idaho 
State Police have promulgated SOP's that fail to require an exacting standard by which a Hearing 
Officer or any Court can determine as a matter of fact whether the State has complied with or 
violated its own standards. As such, the standards have become illusory recommendations at 
best and are essentially no standards at all. In response the Department asserts that even if the 
SOP's are illusory it is irrelevant and if the procedures adopted by the State are meaningless there 
is no authority to vacate a suspension under these circumstances. Respondent's Brief, p.26. 
To the contrary, the State either failed to comply with its own standards, as previously 
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discussed, or its standards are so vague and unenforceable that they have become meaningless. 
The State's illusory standards are most certainly relevant. Moreover, the Department's argument 
that there is no authority to vacate a suspension even if the procedures adopted are meaningless is 
simply wrong. It hardly seems necessary to explain that a hearing to adjudicate, among other 
things, whether a breath testing instrument was functioning properly must include meaningful 
and substantive standards by which to determine compliance and accuracy. "Because the 
suspension of issued driver's licenses involves state action that adjudicates important interests of 
the licensees, drivers' licenses may not be taken away without procedural due process." In re 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 945,155 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). In Idaho, 
this involves a pre-suspension hearing pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A. In order to satisfy 
due process requirements this hearing must be "meaningful." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,541-
42,91 S.Ct. 1586,1590-91 (1971) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 
1187,1191 (1965)). A hearing is anything but meaningful ifit involves procedures that are 
illusory and inadequate to determine the accuracy of the breath testing instrument. 
8. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded the Simulator Solutions Came From 
An "Approved" Provider in Accordance with IDAPA and the Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Mr. Bell argued to the Hearing Officer and again set forth in his Opening Brief that the 
simulator solution used in the calibration checks was not provided by the Department or by a 
source approved by the Department as required by IDAPA and the SOP's. In response the 
Department urges this Court to uphold the Hearing Officer's findings even though it 
acknowledges these findings were premised upon a "reasonable inference" and not direct 
evidence. Respondent's Brief, p.28. 
The fact that the Hearing Officer needed to rely upon a "reasonable inference" to 
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conclude the simulator solution was provided by an approved source highlights the due process 
violation that occurred when the Hearing Officer denied Mr. Bell's subpoena to identifY the 
source of the simulator solution(s). Ex.l, p.20. 
A licensee's right to request the issuance of subpoenas to support a defense is a 
significant factor in avoiding a due process violation when a revocation element is 
established solely by hearsay evidence. 
Thus, reversal ofa revocation on review may be warranted if the Department's 
conduct in failing to issue requested subpoenas has sufficiently impaired a 
licensee's substantial rights to present a defense. 
Gilbert v. Julian, 230 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
Here, the Hearing Officer refused to allow Mr. Bell access to the very information he 
needed to meet his burden and impaired his right to present a defense. Furthermore, the issues 
before this Court are whether the Hearing Officer's findings that the simulator solutions used in 
this case were submitted by an approved provider was clearly erroneous, and whether the 
Hearing Officer's decision exceeded his authority, was made on unlawful procedure, was not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
9. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded Mr. Bell Was Completely and 
Properly Informed ofthe Consequences of Submitting to Evidentiary Testing 
In response to Mr. Bell showing he was not properly advised of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing and that Officer White's conduct constituted trickery and deceit 
thus rendering Mr. Bell's implied consent unreasonable, the Department attempts to justifY 
Officer White's trickery based upon case law which has absolutely no application to obtaining 
one's consent. 
The cases relied upon by the Department authorize certain, purposeful misstatements by 
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police officers during police interrogation, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), in order to gain 
access to a person's home in an undercover capacity, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 
(1966), in order to safely have an occupant answer the door in executing a search warrant, United 
States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Salter, 815 F.2d 
1150 (7th Cir. 1987), and in order to safely enter a residence to execute a valid arrest warrant, 
Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1960). However, none of those cases authorize 
obtaining one's consent through the threat of force or through misstatements of the law. 
Here, Officer White was seeking Mr. Bell's physical consent to submit to evidentiary 
testing. Idaho is an implied-consent state, but the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated the 
implied-consent law does not permit the State to force an individual to submit to evidentiary 
testing. "By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a licensed driver to lawfully 
refuse, but it cannot remove his or her physical power to refuse. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 
368,372, 775 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 
393 (Or. 1981)). 
However, such refusal does not permit the police to obtain an evidentiary sample through 
whatever means they deem necessary. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 714, 184 P.3d 215, 220 
(et. App. 2008) (holding blood draws must be done in a medically accepted manner and without 
umeasonable force), citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966). In fact, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has clearly stated that force - or the threat of force - is not to be used to 
gather such evidence: 
The purpose of a warning of license suspension following a refusal ... is to 
overcome an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of force. It is not to reinstate a 
right to choice, but rather to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied 
consent. []Rather than condone a physical conflict, the legislature provided for the 
administrative revocation of the license of an individual who refuses to comply 
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with his previously given consent. 
Id. at 713,184 P.3d at 219 (emphasis added). 
Of course, constitutional protections prohibit the police from attempting to convince an 
individual to physically consent to evidentiary testing through coercion or duress. See Scheckloth 
V. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,228 (1973) ("the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a 
consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force"); see also 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,438 (1991) ("'Consent' that is the product of official 
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights 
when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse."). Thus, an 
individual's "consent" is involuntary ifhis will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired. State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 744, 778, 152, P.3d 645, 649 (Ct. 
App. 2006); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481,484 (Ct. App. 2006). 
And in any event, the advisory information is statutorily mandated and cannot be 
circumvented. I.C. § 18-8002A(2); In re Cunningham, 2011 WL 310371 (Ct. App. 2011); In re 
Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Ct. App. 1995). Even if consent could be 
constitutionally obtained through coercion or duress, it would not allow the State to circumvent 
the advisory in this manner. 
10. The Hearing Officer Erred in Relying On Officer White's Affidavit Because the 
State Had Constructive Knowledge Officer White Had Been Deemed Not 
Credible and Terminated by the Boise Police Department 
The Department argues it did not have constructive knowledge of Officer White's 
veracity issues. Respondent's Brief, p.36-37. Mr. Bell respectfully disagrees. 
The State ofldaho had actual knowledge of Officer White's veracity issues. Thus, lTD 
had constructive knowledge of this information. It should have been disclosed to Mr. Bell and 
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the Hearing Officer should have taken this into account when resolving factual and legal 
disputes. The entire administrative hearing process is based upon an officer's sworn affidavit 
which the Hearing Officer accepts as truthful. In this case, the Hearing Officer should not have 
relied upon the statements of an officer with known credibility issues. 
III. CONCLUSION 
F or all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Bell's Opening Brief, this Court should set 
aside the Hearing Officer's decision and order that Mr. Bell's driving privileges be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted this cl q day of March, 2011. 
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